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CHAPTER I 
THE PROBLEM, METHOD OF APPROACH AND DEFINI'l'IOOS OF TERMS USED 
In recent years a new and growing development called "incen-
tive financing" has become increasingly im.portant in the long-term 
money market, especially with respect to life insurance companies as a 
source of funds. These investments usually take the form of convertible 
bond or preferred stock direct placement issues or direct placement 
issues in which detachable warrants for the purchase of common stock are 
attached to the senior security evidencing the loan. This development 
makes it possible for corporate borrowers to obtain funds that in many 
cases would otherwise be unavailable while giving the investing institu-
tions the opportunity to boost investment returns through the possibility 
of receiving a capital gains profit in addition to assured interest in-
come. 
I. THE PROBLEM 
It is the purpose of this study (1) to explore the present ex-
tent of direct placement convertible security and warrant financings and 
the specific form they usually take; (2) to analyze the reasons for the 
emergence of this new type of investment and the advantages it offers to 
institutional investors and corporate borrowers; (3) to point out certain 
limitations and problem areas attendant to these investments; and (4) to 
describe and evaluate the techniques of analysis now in use and to present 
a new and consistent approach to the valuation process. 
Any new development in the field of finance having a spectacular 
9 
rise in popularity deserves academic attention. In the case of direct 
placement convertible security and warrant financings the increase in 
significance has been so rapid that not even the parties to the trans-
actions themselves have evolved a comprehensive and analytical method of 
approach. A study of this new and growing development can contribute to 
the understanding of it by the uninitiated; furthermore, by focusing 
attention on some of the current practices and present problems it may 
evoke further evaluations and suggestions. 
II. METHOD OF APPROACH 
In view of the recent emergence of direct placement convertible 
security and warrant financings as a popular form of investment, there is 
very little written material on the subject. 
Pilcher studied in detail the importance of convertible securi-
ties in the public money- market but concluded that during the period 1933 
to 1952 the convertible security had been used only sparingly in the area 
of direct placements.l 
Williams and Williams have recently surveyed the development of 
incentive financing. In describing generally the emergence of such 
I 
transactions as popular forms of investment and the present attitude of 
investors toward them, they conclude that the total volume of such in-
vestments should continue to increase and that they should become a per-
manent part of life insurance company investing.2 They do not, however, 
offer a critical analysis or recommend an analytical technique to be used 
to compare these investments with other conventional investment opportun-
ities. 
10 
In order to determme the extent of life msurance company 
experience with this development and to ascertam current investment 
policies and observations regardmg it, a detailed questionnaire was 
mailed to the thirty-five largest life insurance companies in the United 
7~ States. The results of this survey, supplemented by personal experience 
with life msurance company mvestment practices and by interviews and 
discussions with mvestment officers in various life insurance companies, 
form the basis of this report. 
III. DEFIJ.~ITIOOS OF TERMS USED 
· Incentive financir!_&• The term "incentive financing:' shall be 
interpreted as meaning long term (10 to 20 years) direct placement loans, 
made to corporations by institutional investors, which provide for the 
actual or possible payment of some consideration in addition to fixed 
interest payments. The additional consideration may consist of the resi-
dual value in real or personal property upon maturity of the loan, a bonus 
of co~mon stock given to the institutional lender, an arra~gement to par-
ticipa te directly in the net profits of the borrovling corporation, or more 
commonly, a common stock conversion privilege either in the form of con-
vertible securities or warrants. 
Direct placement. The term "direct placement" or nprivate 
placement" shall be interpreted as meaning a security issue negotiated 
directly between the borrowing corporation and the investing institution, 
*According to a rankL~g by size of total assets in the 1959 Directory of 
the 500 Largest U. s. Corporations, Fortune, August, 1959. 
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with or without the assistance of an intermediary, but without the 
necessity of such a third party, underwriter or broker. This term is 
in direct contrast to public issues of securities. 
Convertible securities. As used throughout this report the 
term "convertible securities" or "convertibles" shall be interpreted to 
mean direct placement issues of debt or preferred stock securities which 
by the nature of their terms are convertible at the option of the holder 
into crnrunon stock of the issuing corporation at specified prices during 
designated periods. 
Warrants. The term "warrants" shall be interpreted to mean 
options to buy a stated number of shares of the issuing corporation 1 s 
common stock at specified prices during designated periods. Normally 
this option is in the form of a certificate attached to the senior 
aecurity evidencing a direct placement loan and it is detachable at the 
option of the holder thereby creating two completely separate and validly 
outstanding issues. 
Equity~· Wherever used, the term "equity call" or "equity 
conversion privilege" shall be interpreted as designating any financing 
arrangement which includes direct placement convertible securities or 
warrants. 
12 
CHAPI'ER II 
THE PRESE..~T EXTENT OF DIRECT PIJ\CEtllllid.'\JT COOVERTIBLE SECURITY FmANCmGS 
I • THE ANALYSIS 
A lack of uniformity in the description of direct placement 
convertible securities makes impossible an accurate tabulation of such 
holdings from life insurance company reports. It is known, however, that 
whereas such financings were extremely uncommon in the past, recent years 
have seen these securities in increasing use. While the available evi-
dence indicates that holdings are still relatively small when weighed 
against total life insurance company portfolios, the rate of growth of 
new purchases of these securities indicates a much more significant 
relationship in the future. Mr. Ralph C. Williams' survey in 1959 indi-
cated a total of at least $300,000,000 of such securities held by life 
insurance companies at that time) 
Of more significance, perhaps, is the following analysis of the 
trend of life insurance company purchases of new investments over the past 
four decades and the relationship of these purchases to the total capital 
needs of the economy. This analysis reveals the impressive growth of the 
type of security financings which are most frequently adaptable to equity 
call arrangements. Confirmaticn of the magnitude of these direct place-
ment convertible security financings is found in the questionnaire survey 
employed in this study. 
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II. THE GROWTH OF LIFE INSURAJ.'iCE CO.'IlPANIES 1 ASSETS AND PORTFOLIO CHANGES 
The impressive growth of United States life insurance companies! 
assets, some forty-eightfold since 1917, is demonstrated in Table I. 
This, of course, represents a similar percentage increase in the invest-
ments owned by these institutions as all but approximately 8% of the 
industry1 s assets consist of investment holdings which are at the discre-
tion of the buying institutions.* 
While the growth of the total assets of the industry is im-
pressive, the changes in the percentage holdings of certain types of 
investments are of even more significance. United States Government 
securities holdings show extreme variations over the period under study. 
But since the increases of these holdings occurred only during the two 
World Wars, it must be concluded that they were functions of the war 
years and that there has been no permanent shift of voluntary investor 
preference for this type of investment. As might be expected, the 
decline of the era of the railroads brought about a marked decline in 
the holdings of railroad bonds by life insurance coinpanies. The only two 
groups of investments which have recorded immense growth over the years, 
in dollar volume and in percentage relationship, are the categories public 
utility bonds and industrial and miscellaneous bonds. Of the two, the 
latter group has shown by far the greatest growth, from .8% of total 
*The rem~n1ng assets consist primarily of policy loans made to 
policyholders and real estate and other assets used in the conduct of the 
insurance business. 
TABLE I 
DISTRIBUI'ION QF ASSEI'S OF UNrrED STATES INSURANCE COMPANIES IN SELECTED YEARS 
(IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) 
State, 
Provin- Indus-
u.s. Foreign cial & Rail- Public trial 
Gov't. Gov't. Local road Utility & Mise. Real Policy Misc. 
Year Securities Bonds Bonds Bonds Bonds Bonds Stocks Mortgages Estate Loans Assets 'Iotal 
1917 ~ 70 $ J-63 $329 $1,813 $ 113 $ 49 $-----cB $ 2,021 $l79 :ji 810 $ 311 $ 5,941 
1920 830 169 350 1, 775 125 49 75 2,442 172 859 474 7,320 
1925 627 154 530 2,238 687 97 81 4,808 266 1,446 6o4 11,538 
1930 319 l6o 1,023 2,931 1,631 367 519 7,598 548 2,8o7 977 18,860 
1935 2,853 189 1,685 2,625 2,114 575 583 5,357 1,990 3,54o 1,705 23,216 
194o 5,767 288 2,392 2,830 4,273 1,542 6o5 5,972 2,065 3,091 1,977 30,802 
1945 20,583 915 1,047 2,948 5,212 1,900 999 6,636 857 1,962 1,738 44,797 
1950 13,459 1,060 1,547 3;187 10,587 9,526 2,103 16,102 1,445 2,413 2,591 64,020 
1955 8,576 410 2,696 3,912 13,968 18,179 3,633 29,445 2,581 3,290 3,742 90,432 
1956 7,555 357 3,011 3,877 14,520 19,787 3,503 32,989 2,817 3,519 4,076 96,011 
1957 7,029 332 3,163 3,863 15,252 21,717 3,391 35,236 3,119 3,869 4,338 101,309 
1958 7,183 320 3,510 3,843 15,938 23,439 4,109 37,062 3,364 4,188 4,624 107,560 
Percentage 
1917 1.2% 2.8% 5·6% 30.5% 1.9% .8% 1.4% 34.0% 3·ocfo 13.6% 5·21> 100.0% 
1920 11.3 2-3 4.8 24.3 1.7 ·7 l.O 33·4 2-3 11.7 6.5 100.0 
1925 5-4 1.3 4.6 19.4 6.0 .8 ·7 41.7 2-3 12.5 5·3 100.0 
1930 1.7 ·9 5-4 15-5 8.6 1.9 2.8 4o.2 2-9 14.9 5-2 100.0 
1935 12.3 .8 7·3 11-3 9-l 2-5 2.5 23.1 8.6 15.2 7·3 100.0 
l94o 18.7 l.O 7-8 9.2 13·9 5·0 2.0 19.4 6.7 10.0 6.3 100.0 
1945 45-9 2.1 2-3 6.6 11.6 4.3 2.2 14.8 l-9 4.4 3·9 100.0 
1950 21.0 1.7 2.4 5.0 16.5 14.9 3·3 25-l 2.2 3.8 4.1 100.0 
1955 9·5 .4 3.0 4.3 15.5 20.1 4.0 32.6 2·9 3-6 4.1 ~-100.0 
1956 7·9 .4 3·1 4.0 15.1 20.6 3·7 34.4 2-9 3·7 4.2 100.0 
1957 6.9 ·3 3-l 3·8 15-l 21.5 3·3 34.8 3.1 3-8 4.3 100.0 
1958 6:7 
·3 3·3 3·6 14.8 21.8 3·8 34.4 3·1 3·9 4.3 100.0 
Source of Data: Institute of Life Insurance 
1-' 
.t::-
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assets in 1917 to 21.8% of total assets in 1958. The changes in dollar 
volume in this period are from 49 million dollars to almost 23.5 billion 
dollar,s, an impressive amount even when measured by today1 s inflated 
dollar. Only the total volume of mortgages held by the industry exceeds 
the aggregate dollar amount invested in industrial and miscellaneous 
corporate bonds. But whereas the latter category shows an impressive 
rate of growth in terms of percentage of total assets of the industry, 
the mortgage category reports the same percentage relationship today as 
it did in 1917. It must be concluded that only in the case of industrial 
and miscellaneous corporate bonds--and to a lesser extent public utility 
bonds--is there a divided trend which reveals an increasing investor pre-
ference among life insurance companies for this type of investment. 
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF DIRE.;CT PLACEMENT FINANCINGS 
Insofar as this study is concerned, the growth in popularity 
among life insurance companies of corporate bond offerings is meaningless 
without an understanding of the frequency with which these bonds are ob-
tained by direct placement; for the direct placement process is one of 
direct negotiation between investors and borrowers which makes possible 
the bargaining for an equity call privilege in a proposed issue. 
Figure l illustrates the relationship of corporate bonds sold 
by direct placement to the total volume of corporate bond offerings. The 
direct placement issues have averaged approximately 750 million dollars 
each quarter since 1952, while the public issues of corporate debt securi-
ties show wide variations, from as high as 2 billion dollars in the first 
quarter of 1958 to a present rate approximately equal to that of the 
BILLIONS 
OF 
OOLLARS 
3·0 
2.0 
1.5 
1.0 
16 
.5 ! PRIVATELY PLACED 
0 
1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 19)8 :1959 
FIGURE 1 
CORPORATE BONOO OFFERED IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 1952 - 1959 BY QUARI'ERS 
Source of Data: Federal Reserve Chart Book 
on Financial and Business 
Statistics, December, 1959 
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direct placement offerings. Put in annual figures, while the total 
offerings of new corporate bonds climbed from $7,083,419,000 in 1953 
to $9,652,791,000 in 1958, the direct placement issues accounted for 
$3,227,514,000 or 45.6% of the total in 1953 and ~3,320,294,000 or 
34.4% of the total in 1958.4 This is not to say, howc.:;ver, that direct 
place!Jl3nt financings are in a down trend. Rather, it appears that 
direct placements can be expected to account for somewhat in excess of 
three billion dollars of new issues each year, and that the public issues 
will make up whatever balance remains. 
Although direct placement issues account for only approxi-
mately 40% of total security issues, the evidence is that they account 
for a much greater proportion of debt securities 0urchased by life in-
surance companies. The Institute of Life Insurance estimates that of 
the $23.4 million of the life companies' industrial and miscellaneous 
bond holdings in 1958, some $20 million had been acquired by the direct 
placement method.5 
The impressive volume of direct .placement financings can be seen 
most clearly, perhaps., by its canparison to the volume of other types of 
financing. For example, the total value of equity issues offered to the 
public for the period 1946 through 1957 was $23.7 billion, while the total 
value of directly placed corporate debt securities for the same period was 
half again as much or $36.9 billion.6 
IV. THE RELATIOOSHIP OF DIRECT PLACEMENTS TO 
CONVERTIBLE AND WARRANT FINAN CINGS 
18 
It is the vast area of direct placement financings that comprise 
the potential market for loans carrying conversion or warrant privileges. 
This is due to the very nature of the direct placement technique, a pro-
cess whereby the terms of the loan are negotiated directly by the borrower 
and the lender. This gives each party the opportunity to seek provisions 
particularly appropriate and most favorable from the respective points of 
view. The increasing frequency of the use of conversion privileges in 
corporate borrowings is testimony of the opportunity for lending insti-
tutions to bargain for them. 
There is evidence that these provisions are no longer rarities 
in the direct placement field; they are increasingly familiar to lender 
and borrower alike. Mr. Homer Chapin, executive vice-president of Massa-
chusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company, points out that in 1957 one deal 
out of every thirty or forty had a "kicker" attached--either warrants for 
common stock or some kind of convertible provision. Now, he says, one 
out of every eight borrowings has a kicker added. 7 
V. THE RELA.TIOOSHIP OF ECO'HllliC AND IlWUSTRIAL GROWTH TO 
DIRECT PLACEMENT CONVERTIBlE AND ~;ARRANT FINAJifCINGS 
The life insurance industry has traditionally provided the 
majority of the long-te~m funds needed for the growth of America's cor-
porations. Table II reveals the sources and the uses of capital funds in 
the United States in 1959. The life insurance companies purchased 
TABLE II 
SOURCES AND USES OF FUNil3 IN THE CAPri'AL MARKEr IN 1959 
(IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS) 
SOURCES OF FUNDS USES OF FUNDS 
-----
State u.s. 'Iota1 
Corp. Corp. & Mun. Gov't. Business Consumer Misc. Sources 
Bonds Stocks Bonds Bonds Mortgages Credit Credit Loans of ?unds 
Savings Institutions 
.6 .4 Life Insurance Companies 2.0 .2 2.1 5-2 
Savings & Loan Associations .8 1-1 8.5 
Mutual Savings Banks ( -1) .1 * 1.8 .1 1.9 
. Corp. Pension Funds 1.0 1.5 ·3 .1 2-9 
2-9 r:-g -:b 1.0 ll-7 -- -- ----:-5 1b-5 Total 
Banking System 
(6~5) 4.0 Commercial Banks 
* 
.8 3-2 2.5 1.0 5-0 
Federal Reserve Banks 1.2 1.2 
Total - - T (5-3) 3-2 ""1i:O 2.5 LO b':"2 
Government Institutions 
State and Local Funds 1.0 
·5 1.6 •• 2 3·3 
u.s. Gov't. & Fed'l. Agencies 
* 
(1.0) 2-1 1.1 
Total 1.0 - :s -:b 2-3 -- -- -- ~
~Jll Other Investors 
Corporations 4.9 3-0 2.4 10.3 
Fire & Casualty Companies 
* 
.2 .8 .1. 
* 
1.1 
Foreigners 
* ·3 3·5 3-8 Individuals and others .1 
-5 2.6 5-1 2-5 .6 11.4 
Total. ---:1 1.0 3-"4 13.6 2-5 ""3.0 ""3.0 -- 2o.o 
Total. Uses of Funds 4.'0 2.8"""" IT 10.0 19-7 --r:o 5:5 """1:"4"" 55."7 
* 
Indicates 1ess than $50 Million 
( } Indicates decrease 
1-' 
Source of Data: Life Insurance Association of America. This is a pre1iminary estimate based on data availab1e in November, 1959· \0 
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$2 billion or half of the net corporate bonds issued during that year.* 
The other money sources have traditional outlets for funds as well, as 
witness the magnitude of stock purchases by pension funds, municipal 
bond purchases by individuals, mortgage purchases by savings and loan 
associations, and short-term business loans and consumer loans by the 
commercial banks. But the significant aspect of investor preferences 
with respect to the present study is the magnitude of life insurance 
companies' purchases of corporate bonds. That the life companies have 
accounted for a most substantial portion of these purchases over the 
recent years is demonstrated in Table III. During the six years from 
1954 to 1959 inclusive, the life insurance industry purchased an average 
of 42% of all new corporate bond offerings. This trend is expected to 
continue into the future, as witness the prediction that life insurance 
companies will purchase $2.3 billion of corporate bonds in 1960 from 
total net offerings of such securities of $5.5 billion.8 
Within the general title of corporate bonds there are distinct 
categories of borrowers who most frequently are the issuers of debt secur-
ities to life insurance companies. An analysis of life companies 1 indus-
trial and miscellaneous bond holdings at the end of 1957 showed that about 
two-thirds of their total investments of this type were in manufacturing 
industries. The ultimate use of life insurance company funds by manu-
facturing industries can also be demonstrated by the predominant employ-
ment of the proceeds for plant and production equipment purchases. During 
*Net of refundings of other securities and payments made an out-
standing obligations. 
Year 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
'rABLE III 
PURCHASES OF CORPORATE BONDS BY U. S. LIFE 
INSURANCE COMPk~IES, 1954-1959 
(IN BILLIOOS OF DOLLARS) 
Net New Issues of 
Corporate Bonds 
3.8 
4.2 
4.8 
7.5 
6.5 
4.0 
Purchases by Life 
Insurance Companies 
2.0 
1.8 
1.9 
2.5 
2.2 
2.0 
21 
Percentage of 
Total Purchased 
52.6% 
42.9 
39.5 
33.3 
33.8 
50.0 
Source of Data: 1959 Record of Life Insurance Investments, Life 
Insurance Association of America 
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the five-year period from 1955 to 1959 inclusive, the estimated uses of 
the net proceedsi~ from offerings of all corporate securities of ~54.2 bil-
lion were 64% for plant and equipment outla.ys, 24% for working capital 
purposes, 5% for the retirement of other securities and 7% for miscella-
10 
neous purposes. Life insurance company dollars are predominantly used 
to finance new or additional manufacturing capacity. 
VI. THE IMPLICATION 
Life insurance companies are the largest buyers of corporate 
bonds. These purchases have also become the most significant single 
category of investments to the life insurance companies themselves. An 
important portion of these purchases are through the direct placement 
medium, a process conducive to the inclusion of convertible provisions. 
Most of these loans are made to manufacturing industries requiring funds 
for the extension of production capacity. It would appear that equity 
call arrangements can be expected to increase in accordance with the fre-
quency of the need of these industries to go to the market place for funds. 
As a result of the dynamically expanding economy predicted during the next 
decade and a need for vastly increased production capacity of American 
industry, direct placement convertible and warrant financings may well be-
come an established pattern permitting a greater future participation in 
corporate profits by life insurance companies. 
*Net proceeds from securities offerings after deducting costs of 
flotation and expenses. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE FINANCING PATTERN 
I. THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
In order to determine the basic characteristics of conver-
tible and warrant security financings and to ascertain current invest-
ment policies and observations regarding them, a detailed questionnaire 
was mailed to the thirty-five largest life insurance companies in the 
United States as ranked by asset size. As of December 31, 1958, the 
companies surveyed had aggregate total assets exceeding ninety billion 
dollars, or 84.3% of the life insurance industry's total assets.12 The 
companies not included in this survey are considered to be sufficiently 
small as to be relatively insignificant in the direct placement field. 
Twenty-two of the thirty companies that replied to the ques-
tionnaire indicated they now hold direct placement convertible issues 
or issues bearing warrants to purchase common stock of the issuing com-
pany. Of the remaining eight companies, all but two indicated an interest 
in such securities, but due to a lack of information concerning them or a 
lack of an appropriate buying opportunity had not as yet made any purchases. 
Seventeen of the companies replied that profits that had been 
realized on these securities have been very substantial in relation to the 
amount of the original investment. The balance of the respondents indi-
cated that the time interval since purchase was too short to determine the 
ultimate profitability. 
The questionnaire replies indicated a scattering of investment 
24 
holdings utilizing other forms of incentive financing. Several companies 
reported the occasional inclusion in direct placement financings of pro-
visions whereby the investor received the residual value of the real or 
personal property being financed upon maturity of the loan. These 
arrangements are particularly prevalent in real estate financings where-
in title to the property reverts to the investing institution. Such an 
agreement conveys to the investor all possible profits resulting from 
appreciation of the property's value. In a few instances the question-
naire replies described railroad car financings in which the residual 
value of the equipment reverted to the institutional investor at conclu-
sion of the loan term. By estimating only a nominal salvage value for 
this "kicker", the life companies reported greatly increased over-all 
investment yields by inclusion of this device in the financings. Mention 
was also made in the questionnaire replies of arrangements whereby the 
investor receives an escalation of interest based upon the net profits or 
production volume of the borrowing corporation. These arrangements seem 
to be most commonly included in gas or oil "production loans". These 
loans often provide for deferred interest payments which are payable in 
the event production exceeds an agreed upon amount, but payment need not 
be made until after payment in full of all fixed interest and principal 
requirements. 
There are also cases of contingent or outright grants of cownon 
stock or other securities as a condition to the insurance company entering 
into the basic financing. But by far the most popular forms of incentive 
financing are direct placement securities which are convertible into the 
issuer's common stock at the option of the holder or which bear detachable 
25 
warrants for the purchase of common stock which may be exercised by the 
holder at his option.* 
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF BOF.RO\ivERS 
As cited in the previous chapter the vast majority of life 
insurance company purchases of direct placement securities are issues of 
manufacturing industries for the purpose of providing funds for plant 
and equipment outlays. Equity call issues, then, are most normally finan-
cings of this type with some other factor present which requires the use 
of a "sweetener" for the investor. 
Usually this factor is an element of risk inherent in the 
investment opportunity not fully compensated for by -interest payments 
alone. This risk element may be the function of the borrower's industry 
or of the borrower's positic:n within the industry. In the former category 
are new industries or types of endeavors yet to be proven as consistently 
profitable. On the other hand, established industries which by the very 
nature of their business are highly cyclical or vulnerable to unfavorable 
economic developments must also be classified as high-risk industries. 
With respect to the borrowing corporations themselves, new companies with-
out established earnings records find themselves dubious credit risks 
regardless of the profitability of the industry in general. Frequently 
the risk element stems from still another cause; that is, well established 
companies in profitable industries requesting loans larger than those con-
*The basic direct placement security is most commonly a bond or 
note, but it is occasionally in the form of preferred stock. 
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sidered acceptable by the traditional credit standards. There is some 
evidence from the questionnaire that equity call financings are sometimes 
arranged not as compensation for added risk but as a result of the basic 
purpose of the loan. Some insurance companies believe that the use of 
loan proceeds for purposes other than fixed asset improvements or working 
capital needs are not traditional insurance company investments. If the 
loan purpose is essentially for the direct benefit of the shareholders, 
the lender may request a participation in these benefits by way of an 
equity call arrangement. Typical of the type of loans in this category 
are loans for the purpose of transferring company ownership. 
Finally, and most importantly, many direct placements are 
arranged with conversion or warrant privileges in lieu of a higher interest 
rate. The additional interest otherwise obtainable may in fact represent 
some extraordinary risk element, but in many instances the interest rate 
sacrificed is a deduction in rate from the fair rate quoted an average-
risk borrower. In other words, some credit situations sug;sest the need 
for an equity call and the full going rate of interest, while in other 
situations the loan may be granted at less than the going rate of interest 
if an equity call is included. In this latter case, the interest foregone 
represents the price paid by the investing institutim for the ccnversicm 
privilege. 
It is interesting to note that life insurance companies seek 
direct placement convertibles or warrants more frequently as a result of 
the general opportunity to obtain them during the course of negotiations 
than as a result of a cognizance of the need for them as risk compensation 
in the loan situation. This tendency of institutional investors was 
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dramatized by the replies to the following question in the survey• 
The number of replies are indicated in parentheses: 
Has your company usually sought and obtained direct placement 
convertibles as a result of: 
(3) a. The purpose of the issue and application of funds. 
(5) b. The type of industry of the borrower. 
(-) c. The historical behavior of the market price of the 
borrower's stock. 
(5) d. New developments or forecasts indicating favorable 
future market behavior of the stock. 
(15) e. The general opportunity to obtain an equity call due 
to the particular negotiations as they happened to 
develop. 
(1) f. The desire to obtain an equity call as a matter of 
regular procedure in all negotiations. (10) g. The credit-standing of the borrowing corporation and 
the presence of an element of risk not fully compen-
sated for by interest alone. 
(-) h. other (Please describe ) • 
It is surprising to note that according to the questionnaire the most 
frequent cause for the issue of equity call securities is the sheer 
coincidence that they happen to be obtainable during the course of loan 
negotiations. In fact, fifteen of the investment officers replying in-
dicated this as a primary cause whereas only ten respondents marked the 
obvious and fundamental reason of a high-risk loan situation requiring 
added consideration as an incentive to enter into the loan. 
III. THE PATTERN OF TERMS 
Provisions and restrictions of a wide variety are included in 
equity call financings just as they are in all other direct placement 
issues. Almost invariably they will include limitations on other indebt-
edness and on dividend payments to stockholders and also a requirement for 
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the maintenance of working capital at a specified minimum level. But 
certain other provisions are unique to incentive financings, as indeed 
they must be by the very nature of the arrangement. 
The most basic provision to be negotiated is the conversion or 
exercise price of the security. In the case of convertible securities, 
the issue bears the option to be converted into common stock at an agreed 
upon unit price of the stock. That is, the purchase of the senior 
security gives the holder the right to exchange that security for common 
stock with no additional cash investment required to effect conversion. 
With a fixed dollar investment, the conversion price per common share 
automatically determines the number of shares obtainable, as well as the 
subsequent cost basis of the common stock. In the case of warrant finan-
cings, the warrants are obtained by the investor at no cost, however, a 
price must subsequently be paid when the warrant is exercised and the 
shares purchased. Typically the initial conversion priee of convertibles 
or the exercise price of warrants is set between ten to twenty per cent 
above the existing market price of the shares at the time of negotiations. 
Depending on the relative bargaining abilities of the borrower and the 
investor, price increases may be established which become effective at 
subsequent dates. That is, there may be several step-ups in the conver-
sion or exercise price over the term of the security. 
Invariably the agreement governing the issue provides for a 
downward adjustment in the conversion or exercise price in the event of 
dilution caused by the sale of stock at a price below the then existing 
conversion price. Although there is a well-established pattern to these 
llanti-dilution provisions 11 , the specified events calling for an adjustment 
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and the techniques of adjusting the price are not uniform in all agree-
ments. 
Although in the case of convertible securities the number of 
common shares obtainable is pre-determined by the conversion price and 
the principal amount of the investment, the number of shares obtainable 
in warrant financings is a function of the separate warrant security and 
is a matter determined by negotiation. The detachable security may be in 
the form of a single warrant carrying the privilege to purchase a speci-
fied number of common shares, or it may be in the form of many warrants, 
carrying the privilege to purchase shares on a one for one exchange basis. 
Regardless of the mechanics of the warrants, the number of shares obtain-
able is subject to negotiation. There appears to be little consistency 
among life insurance companies in the use of analytical techniques to 
determine the proper number of shares. 
Another essential provision of these securities is the term or 
life of the option. In the case of convertible securities, the range in 
term appears to extend from five years to the maturity of the convertible 
security itself. This may be a period as long as fifteen or twenty years • 
ivlore commonly, however, the term of the conversion privilege of a conver-
tible does not exceed ten years, and as noted earlier, there may be 
conversion price increases during that period. 
Closely tied to the question of the term of the conversion 
privilege is the matter of required principal payments on the convertible 
security. Obviously as the principal amount of the security is reduced, 
the number of shares obtainable thereunder is likewise reduced. The nego-
tiations on this point can be a major point of frustration to the investo~ 
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Clearly he wishes an option on the greatest number of shares possible 
for the longest period of time. Yet at the same time he ma;y feel it 
prudent financial management for the loan principal to be amortized over 
a considerable period of time. The solutions to this problem have ranged 
from equal annual principal pa;yrnents on the convertible security over its 
entire life, to principal payments only during the last few years of its 
term after the conversion privilege has expired. 
This problem is not present in the case of warrant financings 
due to the presence of two separate securities. The senior issue has a 
term independent of that of the warrant, and principal payments on it have 
no bearing on the conversion privilege of the warrant. Most typically the 
term of the senior security ranges from ten to twenty years, while the 
term of the warrants rarely exceeds ten years. 
Occasionally the financing will be in the form of a combination 
of securities which deviates slightly from the above form. Several insur-
ance companies have reported package purchases of securities consisting 
of two identical direct placement notes, except that one is convertible 
into common stock. This, of course, means that upon conversion a portion 
of the original debt security remains. A minor deviation in form is a 
single direct placement issue, some principal amount of which is conver-
tible into common stock. 
IV. ACTUAL CASES 
A description of the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
issue and purchase of three equity call financings will illustrate both 
the specific terms referred to earlier and the bargaining approaches of 
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borrowing corporations and the investing life insurance companies. 
The ! Company. In 1958 a life insurance company was asked to 
make a ~1,500,000 fifteen-year loan to a manufacturing company for the 
purpose of transferring ownership of the company to a new group of share-
holders. The shares of the manufacturing company ·were owned by a corpor-
ate parent company engaged in a completely different line of business. 
The parent company desired to sell its investment in order to expand its 
other facilities. It approached a group of individuals as prospective 
buyers, who were quick to see the investment potential especially if the 
manufacturing company could borrow funds to be used as partial pa;yment 
thereby creating leverage in the future company earnings for the new 
stockholders. The buying group proposed to a life insurance company a 
financing plan whereby the loan proceeds, together with substantial cash 
assets in excess of company requirements, would be utilized for the pur-
chase by the company of common stock from the selling stockholders. The 
outstanding stock would be sufficiently reduced by this action to enable 
the individual stock purchasers to buy from the selling corporation all 
of the then remaining shares. 
In the eyes of the life insurance company investment officers 
the loan was a sound one in every respect except, perhaps, insofar as the 
basic purpose of the loan might be considered unusual. Even after giving 
effect to the reduction of net worth resulting from the proposed treasury 
stock, the borrowing company could still pass very satisfactorily all of 
the statistical and financial standards of the insurance company to qualify 
for the loan. Furthermore, the proposed borrower 1 s industry was sound, 
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its position within the industry was excellent, and the new owner and 
management group was very highly regarded. The borrowing company quali-
fied in every ftmda!llental rec;l{:;ct for the loan except that to tl1o irwest-
,;l·a,d. nf!j cf,I s :ii. see~;~l':,J. OYl;_y ._)rO~Y~r that the ir1surance company which would 
make the stockholder profits possible should share to some extent in those 
profits. It vvas apparent to the insurance company that the future earnings 
prospects of the co.ll.pany were very bright, especially on an earnings-par-
share basis due to the reduced cap.i tali?.ation. The outstanding common 
stock of approximately 100,000 shares would initially have a book value 
of about :;plO per share. Earnings per share for the immediate years ahead 
were conservatively estimated at .34 each year. 
During negotiations the insurance company expressed an interest 
in obtaL0ing some kind of equity call arrangement and finally it offered 
the borrowing canpany a reduction in the interest rate from 5~ to 5% if 
a conversion privilege were included. The insurance company asked for 
warrants bearing an option to purchase 10,000 shares of common stock at 
$12 per share for a ten-year period. The number of warrants requested 
was determined not by calculation but by certain state regulatio11s 
limiting the am01mt of common stock a life company could own of any one 
corporation. The suggested option price of ~12 was determined solely as 
being the amount which would be twenty per cent above the beginning book 
value of the shares. The buying group resisted these terms vigorously 
and offered a counter proposal which ultimately was accepted by the life 
insurance company officers. The parties agreed to a $1,500,000 5% fifteen-
year loan bearing warrants to buy 5,000 shares of common stock at prices of 
$12 per share for the first three years, $15 per share for the next three 
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years, and $20 per share for a final three-year period. At the end of 
the nine-year term the warrants would expire if not previously exercised. 
Since the outstanding stock would be closely held, the borrowing company 
agreed that in order to provide a market for the newly issued stock after 
exercise of the warrants, it would repurchase the shares at their then 
existing book value at any time upon request by the insurance company. 
The subsequent actual earnings of the borrowing company have 
exceeded all expectations of the buying group and the insurance c o~npany 
alike. As a consequence, based on the book value buy-back agreement the 
insurance company already has a handsome paper profit. In actuality, 
however, its profit to date would have been greater had the insurance 
company accepted the one-half of one per cent higher interest rate instead 
of the warrants. 
This case is an example of an equity call financing for a com-
pany without the presence of additional risk elements. For the conversion 
privilege the life insurance company paid a price ·which was the alternative 
of receiving one-half of one per cent per year on a fifteen-year declli1ing 
loan having an original balance of $1,500,000. A subsequent chapter of 
this study will analyze this action and atte!npt to determine the relative 
profitability of the two alternatives. 
The ~ Company. Another actual case concerns a loan by an insur-
ance company in 1959 to a bank holding company. The borrowing corporation 
retained an investment banking firm to facilitate the private sale of a 
$1,000,000 5% Convertible Note maturing in twenty years. The proceeds were 
to be used to buy additional bank shares. The provisions of the note 
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required no principal payments prior to maturity. However, they provided 
that the note was to be convertible at any time bto common stock at a 
price of 036 per share. The current market price was ~30. The invest~ent 
banking firm approached a life insurance company as a potential buyer. The 
life company evidenced strong interest in view of the fine credit standing 
of the company, the secure nature of its type of business, and the unchal-
lenged ability of the management group. It was an excellent company and 
in the opinion of the invest~ent officers the current market value of the 
shares was undervalued. Furthermore, the future earnings prospects were 
exceptionally good which gave the conversion feature even more appeal. 
The only question was the matter of interest rate. The suggested 5% rate 
was approximately 1% below the rate at which the life insurance company 
would lend .~1,000,000 to this company without any conversion privilege. 
It was likewise approximately 1% below the rate at which there were avail-
able alternative investments in companies of comparable credit. Event-
ually the life insurance company purchased the issue after negotiating a 
decrease in the conversion price from $36 to #35, and after decidin.g it 
was likely it would make sufficient profits on the conversion feature to 
more than offset the l% in additional interest otherwise available on a 
6% $1,000,000 twenty-year loan. 
As far as the borrowing company was concerned, the equity call 
method of financing has a twofold advantage over other techniques of 
capital raising. One, it provided funds at a lower interest cost, and 
two, the conversion feature provided the likelihood of the relatively fast 
elimination of the note thereby permitting the sale of additional debt 
se curi tias in the future. Due to the short period of existence there has 
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not as yet developed a profit in the conversion feature and the note has 
not been converted. 
The _Q Company. A final cas8 history concerns that of financing 
a new venture. A small but well-established commercial fertilizer manu-
facturing company desired diversification in the chemical industry. It 
approached a life insurance company to obtain a .$J,.500,000 twelve-year 
loan to be used to construct a new chemical plant. The plant would have 
a competitive advantage over other suppliers due to the utilization of a 
recently developed manufacturing process. The production forecasts and 
market studies were extremely encouraging and it appeared that the pro-
posed diversification plans were sound. Nevertheless, in view of the 
magnitude of the venture when weighed against the going business and the 
complete dependence on the new project for debt repayment, the insurance 
company requested as securit;yr a mortgage on the new plant as well as an 
above-average interest rate. It was finally azreed that the financing 
would be done at 4}%--an attractive yield in 1954. Furthermore, as an 
added incentive to make the loan the company agreed to make ;;;.;17.5 ,000 
principal amount of the loa.'! convertible into common stock at any time 
before maturity at a conversion rate of .jjilO per share. 
In this case the conversion feature was not offered in exchange 
for a reduction in interest rate, rather it was added to an already high 
interest rate to offset the high risk inherent in the venture. The invest-
ment was attractive to the insurance company on several grounds. It 
offered an opportunity to receive an above-average interest return during 
a period of low money rates. Furthermore, the conversion privilege made 
possible even greater profits should the new venture increase company 
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profits and the market value of the company's common shares. Finally, 
this financing would make possible a continuing loan relationship with 
the borrowing company if the new plant succeeded to a point requiring 
further capital expansion. With respect to the borrowing corporation, 
this financing technique made available funds for a much desired diver-
sification program that probably would otherwise have been unavailable. 
The subsequent events surprised all the parties. Due to 
repeated delays in the construction of the chemical plant and certain 
desi~n weaknesses in its new manufacturing process, the borrowing corpor-
ation was compelled to borrow large additional runounts of money to canplete 
the project. The resulting high capital costs ·were of sufficient burden 
to the borrower that the projected profit levels have never been reached. 
In fact severe losses developed in several years giving the life insurance 
company concern over the safety of its loan. Also as a result of these 
losses, the market value of the comp~1y 1 s co~~on shares fell to a point 
making profits on the conversion feature practically inconceivable during 
the years ahead. It should be noted, however, that these developments 
have no bearing on the inclusion of an equity call provision in the finan-
cing plan. Rather, they stem from engineering and construction difficulties 
which would have occurred regardless of the method of finance. A more ana-
lytical approach on the part of the life insurance company, however, would 
have fully demonstrated the added risk of this venture by equating it to 
the probable return from the equity call feature. In other words, a con-
servative valuation of the conversion privilege would have sho-wn how little 
the potential reward was on an inherently high-risk loan situation. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSBS OF THIS DEVELOPMENT 
I. THE QUESTIQ~NAIRE 
In order to determine the major causes for the emergence of 
direct placement ccr1vertible securities and warrants as popular forms of 
financing, the questionnaire asked the life insurance company represen-
tative to select from a list of possible causes those they felt had been 
the most influential. Although a number of different reasons were cited, 
the recent 11 tight 11 money market was considered by far the most significant. 
II. THE HIGH DE1tA..IIJD FOR FUNDS. 
A 11 tight 11 money market condition refers to one in which the 
demand for capital is sufficiently greater than its supply to create a 
shortage of loanable funds. This condition, quite naturally, is reflected 
in the price of money or level of interest rates. Figure 2 illustrates 
the sharp rise in interest rates during the five-year period 1955 through 
1959. During this period the Moody's Baa Corporate Bond Average climbed 
from about 3~ to 5i%. A similar movement v-as experienced in the indices 
of bonds of various other qualities. Only in 1958 did interest rates de-
cline, and that must be attributed to the business recession and the activ-
ities of the Federal Heserve System at that time to 11ease 11 money to speed 
the recovery. It was during this same interval of rising interest rates 
that equity call financings had their impressive growth. V1•hen these finan-
cings are viewed as an alternative to higher interest rates, or in some 
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cases as the only financing technique by which funds will be made available, 
it is not surprising that there is a distinct correlation between their use 
and the scarcity of loanable funds. 
A number of life insurance company investment officers commented 
that when considering a loan application there is a general hesitancy on 
their part to exceed a level in interest rates of about 6%. Not only are 
yields in excess of this usurious in some states, but there is a reluc-
tance ~~ong some investment officers to sponsor what other observers may 
regard as an extremely high-risk loan situation due to the unusually high 
interest rate. The equity call arrangement can serve as an alternative 
to the otherwise necessary increment of interest. 
III. CCMPETITIVB PRESSURES 
The life insurance business is a highly competitive one that 
competes in some measure on the relative success of the comp~ .. lies 1 in-
vestment departments. Not only must the cash flow from the payments of 
insurance premiums be invested at as high a return as possible, but the 
investment officers must also find an outlet for funds representing re-
payments or liquidation of existing invest~ents. This reinvestment prob-
lem becomes more acute each year, and it can be recognized by the immense 
quantities of new purchases required to increase total net holdings. In 
1958, for example, the industry's total holdings of industrial and miscel-
laneous corporate bonds increased some 1.7 billion dollars, but total pur-
chases of such investment exceeded 4.7 billion dollars.13 Despite a general 
shortage of loanable funds in recent years, this intense pressure to invest 
capital and to maximize returns for competitive purposes has created an 
40 
investor ingenuity conducive to the development of equity call financings. 
Certainly also, the po,,ularity of this development has been influenced by 
the successes of other life insurance companies who pioneered in such 
financings. 
IV. INFLATIOl.IJ .AND THE EQUITY NJARKET 
Somewhat akin to the competitive pressures from other life 
insurance companies, the pressure from gradual inflation has increased 
competition from other forms of savings media. Although life insurance 
is a product unique insofar as the basic insurance protection is con-
cerned, it must also be regarded as a saving·s medium as well. Along with 
compet.i t.::_ori fer the savinr;s dollar from the unprecedented movement in the 
common stock market since the close of 't.orld War II. Fie;ure 3 illustrates 
this trend. During the years from 19.52 through 19.59 the Dow Jones Indus-
trial Stock Average moved from approximately 27.5 to just slie;htly under 
700. 
Although there is s orne evidence that egui ty calls have gained 
in popularity as a result of their facility as capital gains vehicles, it 
appears that the vast majority of life insurance company investment 
officers prefer outright ovmership of common stocks as an inflation hedge. 
Perhaps this may be due to the unlimited selectivity possible when acquir-
ing the equity security, whereas convertibles and warrants may be available 
from only a relatively few number and types of canpanies 
On the other hand, there is some evidence that the borrowing 
companies are encouraged by a rising stock market to enter into convertible 
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security and warrant financings, Pilcher points out that the management 
of borrowing corporations in periods of rising stock prices seeks to take 
advantage of probable higher common stock prices later by marketing con-
vertible securities, The motivation for issuing the convertible is the 
desire to sell common stock at a price above current quotations.14 
V. LEGAL RES'l'RICTIOOS a-J STOCK OWNERSHIP 
Althouth several investment officers indicated that a cause of 
this new development had been the state-imposed restrictions on stock 
ovmership by life insurance companies, most investment offi.dals believe 
that these regulations are not sufficiently restrictive to cause investors 
to resort to indirect stock ownership. A look at the record appears to 
justify this conclusion. At the end of 1958 the total stocks o~ned by 
the life insurance industry amounted to 2,548 milljon dollars or 2.37% 
of the industry's total admitted assets.15 Although there are individual 
companies exceeding this investment percentage considerably, on balance 
the amount of funds invested in common and preferred stocks by most com-
panies does not approach the limits imposed by the regulatory authorities. 
VI. INCOivl8 TAX lEGISLATION 
Contrary to expectations, the questionnaire results indicated 
that very few of the life insurance companies surveyed expect that the 
1959 tax law vnll hasten the development of equity call type financing. 
The recent legislation, by changing the entire basis for taxation of life 
insurance companies, increases the effective tax on investment income very 
substantially. en the other hand, while a capital gains tax was also 
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imposed by this legislation, as a practical matter no capital gains tax 
will be paid in the foreseeable future by any insurance company. This is 
due to the right to offset gains with capital losses and the presence of 
the many unrealized losses on the books of all life insurance companies 
stemming from the purchase of low-coupon bonds at par during periods of 
low interest rates. 
It would appear that this important tax advantage would hasten 
the further development of equity call financings as well as all other 
capital gains vehicles available to the life insurance companies. 
CHAP'IER V 
ADVANTAGES OF' DIRECT PLACE1;JENT CCXJV£RTIBLE SECURITY 
AJ.'JD WARF.ANT FINAN CINGS 
I. AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS 
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The greatest contribution of incentive financing to the finan-
cial community has been the introduction of a new element of flexibility 
into institutional lending. For many borrmving companies it has provided 
funds that would othe~dse not be available on an interest basis alone. 
Testimony to this conclusion is found in the questionnaire results. The 
life insurance company representatives were asked if borrowing companies 
ever offered on their own initiative to grant equity call provisions. 
The replies were unanimous that they did. VVhen asked for the apparent 
motivation behind such action, the majority of replies indicated that the 
potential borrowers apparently knew that funds would otherwise be unavail-
able. As far as the initiation of such provisions by the institutional 
lenders is concerned, many investment officers indicated that they did so 
because of the credit standing of the borrowing company and the presence 
of an element of risk not fully compensated for by interest alone. In 
other words, funds for the expansion and development of these companies 
would otherwise not have been advanced were it not for equity call 
financings. 
II. AN AL'fH:RNATIVE TO HIGHER ThTTEFl<:ST PAYMENTS 
A conversion privilege can mean higher profits and greater cash 
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generation to the borrowing corporation as well as to the investor. The 
very fact that the company is borrowing funds indicates a need to conserve 
cash for the purpose of the borrovd.ng. Most normally this is a capital 
asset improvement program or some other development in the company's pro-
gress. As an alternative to higher interest payments, an equity call 
arrangement means lower immediate costs or cash savings when the borrowing 
corporation needs it the most. 
III. INCREASED INVESTNiENT IlliTURN 
An obvious advanta;;e of this financing technique from the point 
of view of the lender is the opportunity of the creditor to participate 
in the profits of the borrovver. Although the period of trial is still 
short, the experience to date indicates that the return on equity call 
investments can be very substantial. Of course individual cases have 
occurred in which the incentive compensation has proved worthless. In fact 
it is likely- that there have been, and will be in the future, principal 
losses due to the higher risk factor present in many such investments. 
Nonetheless the current profit experience indicates that the gross returns 
from equity call provisions are substantial enough to assure the investor 
an above-average overall yield after deducting actual or potential losses. 
IV. THE PLA.CEJ!EI-.JT OF EQUITY SECURITIES 
Many times, the issuer needs the funds for expansion today, but 
cannot afford the cost of common capital until the invested funds have 
begun to earn their way. An important advantage of equity call provisions 
from the view point of the borrower is the opportunity to sell common stock 
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at prices above current quotations and to delay delivery until the pro-
ceeds from the financLDg have had time to be put to work in the generation 
of higher stockholder profits. Further reassurance to company managements 
is the knowledge that dilution will not occur until earnings have improved 
sufficiently to be reflected in a higher price level of the stock. Viewed 
in this way, dilution in earnings-per-share can be minimized by the use of 
equity call financings to effect a larger equity base. A further benefi-
cial effect on earnings-per-share is the cessation of interest payments 
upon conversion of the convertible security. In the case of warrant 
financings, the interest payments do not cease, but additional cash is 
available to the company for profit generation upon exercise of the war-
rants and purchase of the stock. Pilcher cc:ncluded that the primary moti-
vation for the issuance of a convertible security in the public market was 
the desire to raise cormnon capital. In his survey 63% of the life insur-
ance companies indicated the greatest weight to this motivation.16 
V. SALABILITY OF SUBORDL~AThD DEBT ISSUES 
In the opinion of Mr. Ralph C. Williams, a major advantage to 
the issuer of convertible securities is their use as a sales tool to 
effect placement of subordinated debt issues. In companies and indus-
tries characterized by lart;e amounts of senior indebtedness, junior 
securities must, of course, carry a higher interest rate than senior debt. 
But even this factor has not seemed to many investment officials to be 
enough consideration for taking a subordinated position. Accordingly, in-
creasing numbers of junior securities carry equity call provisions as an 
inducement to the investing institution. 
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VI. IN CREASED NUMBER OF SHAREHOLDERS 
The direct placement of a convertible or warrant issue with a 
life insurance company is advantageous li1 yet another respect. Ultimate-
ly after conversion and distribution of the stock by the life insurance 
company the stockholder list of the corporation will be larger and con-
tain possibly a different type of shareholder than formerly. This can 
be an important consideration to many borrowers, especially if they are 
small but fast-gro~Qng concerns anxious to establish a broad equity 
ownership. 
VII. NCN-FINAN CIAL CCNSIDERATirnS 
A major advantage of this form of financing to some borrovling 
corporations is the non-financial implication of the alternative of a 
higher interest rate. The grant of a conversion privilege may reduce 
the interest rate or stated cost of the loan sufficiently to avoid the 
need for the borrowing company to risk an unfavorable reaction from 
showing in published financial reports a loan carrying an unusually high 
interest rate. 
With respect to the investing institution, this development 
permits it to continue a loan relationship with old customers it might 
now consider as marginal credits. Furthermore, it permits the investor 
to build new relationships with companies having unproven records but 
promising futures. These relationships are essential to life insurance 
companies as a means of providing continuity of investment outlets for 
the immense capital funds subject to reinvestment pressures. 
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CHAPTER VI 
PROBLEMS AND LIMITATICNS AS A FINAi\J CTI~G TECHNIQUE 
I. CCNSIDERATICNS TO THE ll'JVBSTOR 
Despite the various advantages of direct placement security 
and warrant financings to a potential life insurance company investor, 
several limitations and considerations exist which must be carefully 
evaluated either prior to the purchase of a given investment of this 
type or during its term after purchase. These factors range from 
qusstions concerning portfolio management and the financial return of 
the investment to considerations of a non-financial nature. 
Investment Policy. A basic decision must initially be reached 
concerning the desirability of purchasing higher-risk investments. As 
pointed out previously, the emergence of direct placement convertible 
securities and warrants as popular forms of investment has coincided with 
a period of high money rates. This means that conventional debt secur-
ities of established and highly respected companies are competing in the 
money market for available loan funds on a relatively high interest basis. 
This si tuatian offers money managers an opportunity to up-grade the 
quality of new investment purchases and by doing so to receive perfectly 
satisfactory yields by traditional standards. The alternative, of course, 
is to advance funds to companies of less acceptable credit and to receive 
even higher yields. The basic decision to be made is whether in view of 
the existing portfolio balance an upgrading of the yield or of the quality 
of new holdings should be emphasized. Many of the equity call financings 
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are loan situations promising a higher investment yield at the expense of 
increased risk of loss of principal. The investment policy of each life 
insurance company must make the determination during periods of high inter-
est rates of whether new security purchases should emphasize yield or 
quality. There appears to be no unanimity on this point. bhereas some 
of these institutional investors stress the unusually high investment re-
turns available during such periods, other companies take the opportunity 
to upgrade portfolio quality and receive a lesser but nonetheless satis-
factory yield on new purchases. Probably this lack of consistency within 
the industry explains why some life companies are more receptive to equity 
call offerings than are others. 
In addition to the risk stemming from the decreased safety of 
principal in some convertible security and warrant financing, a further 
financial risk is present when the interest rate is reduced below the 
going rate in exchange for the possibility of a capital gain. Here the 
risk consists of the "price 11 of the equity call feature which is the 
amount of additional interest otherwise available on a conventional finan-
cing pattern. Once again we find little consistency among the investment 
purchasers. Some feel it advantageous to sacrifice a portion of interest 
in hopes of a far greater over-all investment return, while others see no 
reason to give up any part of a guaranteed yield which is more than suffi-
cient in itself. 
The Technique of Profit Taking. The technique employed in profit 
taking can pose several questions to the investing institution. The holder 
of the convertible or warrant security has at all times during the term of 
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the option the election of: 1) holding the original security, 2) con-
verting that security and retaining the common stock for further invest-
ment, 3) selling the original security, or 4) converting that security 
and disposing of the underlying common stock. The weight of evidence 
indicates that in relatively few instances does the investing life in-
surance company retain for permanent investment the shares of stock 
obtained through conversion of a senior security. Apparently most 
equity-call financings represent issues considered secure as debt instru-
ments but less dependable as equity issues. In other words, the issuer's 
stock may have short-term profit potentials although it is not sufficient-
ly seasoned to be included in the permanent common stock portfolios. 
Consequently most profits are realized during the term of the option 
either by selling the original security at a gain or by converting into 
and selling the underlying common stock. 
Relatively few life insurance companies report the conversion 
into common shares and the retention of that stock for further investment. 
In some cases, however, the holders have don'c :-:oo ln order to effect a more 
orderly sale of the common stock while takll1~ profits. This usually occurs 
in situations where the stock is not readily marketable. Under those cir-
cumstances, the conversion into common stock and the subsequent sale of 
the stock over a period of time in a series of sr~ll transactions may in-
crease profits. This is accomplished by preventing the market price of 
the stock from beine depressed from too great a supoly of stock being 
offered in the market place at any one time. By avoiding sale at distressed 
prices the equity-call security holder's profits are increased. 
Also rare is the conversion of the senior security or warrant 
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into common shares vvi. th the intention of holding the shares rather than 
the option for invest~ent purposes. Undoubtedly warrru1t issu0s which re-
quire cash payment to effect conversion are not exchanged prior to profit-
taking because doing so would increase the cash investment with no adva.."l-
tage gained for the holder. In the case of convertible holdLngs where no 
further cash payment is required to effect conversion, the apparent 
reason for the lack of premature conversion is simply that most investment 
managers do not want those equity issues to appear in the company's per-
manent common stock portfolio. 
The Timing of Profit Taking. Once the conversion privilege has 
obtained value through a rise in the market value of the borrowing com-
pany's common stock the decision must be made as to when to take the 
profit. The decision should be based upon such factors as the then pre-
sent estimate of the future earnings of the company, an analysis of the 
technical position of the stock market in general, income tax consider-
ations, and pending changes in the price of other terms of the conversion 
privilege. 
The prevalent attitudes of insurance companies with respect to 
the timing of profit taking appears to be varied. In some cases the invest-
ing institutions have shown the utmost patience in regard to mounting un-
realized gains. Conversion options are considered to have been acquired 
at no cost, therefore any and all profits are deemed pure gaL"l no matter 
how lone the basic securities are held. On the other hand, the record 
shows that in many cases the inclination is to take profits fairly quickly 
once a gain is established. In a few instances the problem has been 
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hedged through the prompt sale of a portion of securities reflecting a 
gain and the retention of the balance in hopes of greater subsequent 
profits. The survey inquired of the techniques now in use by life L~sur-
ance companies with respect to this problem. The replies indicated that 
there tends to be little consistency on this point even ~~thin each inves-
ting institution. There is the apparent belief that since the options 
were acquired at no cost, there is no investment at risk and therefore 
less concern need be given to equity-call profit takinE than to the sale 
of other conventional securities. 
It seems clear that in the final analysis the determination of 
when to realize a gain should rest in an evaluation of the future profit 
potential of the security as weighed against alternative investment oppor-
.tuni ties. Once a paper profit has been achieved, the conversion privilege 
or warrant which originally was obtained at no cash expense takes on a 
~< 
very real cost element." The deciding factor in the minds of the invest-
ment managers with respect to the timing of profit taking should be their 
judgement as to whether the conversion privilege can earn in the future a 
greater return on its then existent cost than any other investTient alter-
native available to them. Even though future additional profits are fore-
cast on an equity call security, it should be sold and the proceeds 
reinvested elsewhere if a greater future return can be achieved by doing 
so. 
* The opportunity cost of the cash obtainable through profit 
taking. 
53 
Choosing the Form. Parallel in many respects to the problem of 
the timing of profit taking is the matter of choosing the form of the 
equity call. The convertible debt security carries the distinct disadvan-
tage to the investor of be coming extinguished upon conversion by its holder. 
The rise in the price of the issuer's co~non stock which precipitates con-
version and profit takins by the convertible security holder most often is 
the result of an increase in the earnings of the issuing corporation. 
Therefore the debt security is extinguished just when earnings have im-
proved causing the security's quality to become improved. The better a 
debt instrument the convertible becomes in the eyes of the holder, the 
more likely he is to lose it through conversion. 
A corollary problem to the investor is the possible loss not 
only of an investment of superior quality but one bearing an attractive 
interest rate as well. Noted earlier is the fact that most equity call 
arrangements have been entered into when money rates have been high. 
Therefore most convertibles are high-interest bearing securities, and 
their conversion causes the loss of an above average interest return. 
These difficulties are largely overcome in financings employing 
detachable warrants. Here there is a separation of the debt security and 
the equity feature enabling the holder to retain an attractive debt secur-
ity after realizing a profit on the warrants. It would seem that only in 
those cases where the L~vestor enters into the financing for the express 
purpose of a short-term profit on the equity call is it advantageous to 
employ convertibles. 
Liquidity of the Invest1nent. Quite apart from the likelihood of 
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appreciation of the equity call security is the question of its market-
ability once appreciation has taken place. A great many of the direct 
placement convertible security and warrant financings in existence are 
the issues of relatively small corporations. The marketability of the 
common stock obtainable upon conversion is sometimes impaired as a con-
sequence of private o~nership of large amounts of the company 1s presently 
outstanding capital shares. The marketability is further limited when the 
company• s shares are not listed with a stock exchange. Finally, the in-
vestor in equity call securities is faced with the potential difficulty 
of disposing of a large block of co~~on under the foregoing conditions. 
Such a situation may indicate the need for a secondary offering and 
underwriting of the shares to insure sale by the holder. Such action, of 
course, may be costly to the holder thereby reducing profits on the sale. 
In order to determine the opinion of institutional investors on 
these matters the questionnaire inquired whether the life insurance com-
panies considered that ready marketability of the borrower 1 s common stock 
is a vital aspect in obtaining convertibles or warrants. The surprising 
reply from the overwhelming majority of the life companies v~as that there 
was no particular concern on this point. When asked further if in cases 
where the stock is not particularly marketable the insurance company ob-
tains a buy-back agreement of some kind with the borrowing corporation or 
other parties, the re9ly was ~nanimous that they did not as they simply 
hoped to find a buyer when the need subsequently arose. Some investment 
officers take the position that in an expanding economy and business com-
munity most small, privately-owned companies of today will become the large 
publicly-owned corporations of tomorrow. The problem will therefore solve 
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itself, it is felt, as the stock will have become marketable by the time 
a profit has developed. 
Prudent financial management would seem to indicate the need 
for greater attention to this problem. In cases where the stock is not 
now marketable some kind of a redemption agreement should be negotiated 
with the equity call issuing corporation or with the corporation's present 
stockholders. Only in cases where an enormous potential profit is fore-
seeable at a nominal opportunity cost to the purchaser should this con-
sideration be ignored. 
Securities and Exchange Commission Registration. An area of 
uncertainty at the present time is the status of equity call securities 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Originally considered as 
private sales of securities and therefore exempt from SEC regulation 
along with other direct placement issues not being distributed to the 
public, a recent ruling may now require registration of equity call 
securities with the SEC upon subsequent disposal. In effect the Commis-
sion has opined that the very nature of a security bearing conversion 
privilege indicated the intention to make a public sale and distribution 
of the common stock at some later date •18 One interpretation of the new 
ruling is that if the underlying common stock pertaining to a direct 
placement convertible security or warrant financing must be registered, 
then the basic convertible security itself should be registered. This is 
in contrast to direct placement debt securities where the genuine inten-
tion of the parties is that the private buyer vall hold it for permanent 
investment. This "private sale" concept avoids any need for SEC regis-
tration for a public offering. 
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Currently this situation is unsettled and the interpretations of 
the SEC ruling are conflicting. It is held by some parties that the reten-
tion of the convertible security for a :period of more than a year and its 
ultimate sale privately will qualify the issue for exemption from SEC 
regulation. 
A provision in the purchase agreements relating to many equity 
call issues provides that upon request by the holder the issuing corpor-
ation will seek and obtain registration with the SEC of both the conver-
tible security and the underlying common stock. In effect such a provi-
sion protects an equity call buyer from all possibilities. If at a future 
date a re~istration is required, the issuer is obligated to seek such 
registration upon request. Certainly this provision should always be 
included in such financings at least until a final determination of this 
matter is made by the SEC. 
Borrower Helations. A final consideration to the investing 
institution in equity call issues is their possible effect upon the busi-
ness relationship established with the issuer. Some insurance companies 
are reluctant to negotiate for conversion privileges on the premise that 
prospective borrowers will be offended by a request to share in the com-
pany's or the stockholders' future profits. Such a request, they reason, 
might cause a disturbance in traditional outlets for investment funds. The 
weight of evidence, however, indicates no such effects when the financings 
are soundly based and arranged in a manner providing advantages to the 
borrower as v.ell. 
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II. CO.'l"SIDERATICNS TO THE ISSUER 
In addition to the factors to be weighed by the investor are 
the limiting considerations of this financing technique to be evaluated 
by the issuing corporation. These considerations include the financial 
effects of equity call arrangements on the stockholders of the issuer as 
well as on the corporation itself. 
Alternative Sources of Caoital. A fundamental problem in the 
minds of company management is the relative cost of other techniques 
which might be employed to raise the needed funds. As noted earlier in 
this study, the issuing corporation often has a choice of borrowing the 
funds at a somewhat higher interest cost in lieu of the grant of the con-
version privileges. Also available in many cases are the opportunities 
to raise funds through the issue of preferred or common shares of stock 
or through a sale and lease-back arrangement of some kind. Company man-
agement must bear clearly in mind not only the relative corporate costs 
of these alternatives but also their effect on the stockholder through a 
dilution in earnings-per-share or a reduction in the prevailing price-
earnings ratio of the company's common stock. It may be that a substan-
tial dilution of common equity through ultimate conversion of the equity 
call arrangement is more detrimental to shareholders then what appears to 
be a higher immediate interest cost to the corporation. 
The Form of Equity Call. Closely related to choosing between an 
equity call financing and other financial arrangements is the ultimate con-
sideration of the form of the equity call itself. Both convertible senior 
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securities and warrants indicate future possible dilution in earnings-
per-share. But the convertible security offers as compensation for this 
dilution the eli~ination of the burden of the debt security and its 
interest charges simultaneously upon conversion and the issue of the 
additional shares. This should be considered by the issuer as a very 
real advantage of converticles as a form of equity calls. en the other 
hand, detachable warrants normally may be exercised only upon an addi-
tional cash pa~nent. This requirement means that substantial swns of 
cash will be paid to the Company at some future date when exchange into 
stock is accomplished. This may be a very real benefit to a comp&~y 
having a continuing expansion program and a permanent need for new cap-
ital funds. Cash paid in upon exercise of the warrants ma:r be '}ilickly 
put -':,o use tc generate additional earnings as an offset to dilution of 
shareholder's earnings. The determination as to which form of equity 
call is most advantageous should therefore be made on the basis of the 
future capital needs and financing plans of the issuer. 
A final consideration in determining the form of equity call 
is the choice between a debt security or preferred stock as the basic 
security. Due to the tax deductibility of interest, this decision is 
normally in favor of a debt security unless the existine; capital struc-
ture of the company is already heavily structured with dect. In this 
event, a preferred stock issue offers the more conservative course of 
action. 
Non-Financial Considerations. Under certain circumstances the 
non-financial consicerations may be at least as important as the more 
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tangible ones. The questionnaire revealed that at times a consideration 
to the issuer is the possibUi ty of large blocks of can.mon stock falling 
into "unfriendly hands. 11 Eie;ht of the institutions repl;ying to the ques-
tionnaire stated that borrowing companies had in tbe past expressed con-
cerll about this poss:;_bility. Another eight institutions said that they 
had been told at times that company management feared loss of control to 
the investing institution. These fears seem to be largely unfounded, as 
investing institutions sbow no :irlClination to exercise managerial rights 
so lone; as the issuing corporation is not in financial difficulties. 
F"Llrthermore, a certain amount of potential control is usually granted to 
the purchaser of any private placement security througb financial restric-
tions in the loan agreements of those securities. 
Finally, there may be the consideration of future relations 
with the investor in the event a substantial profit is made by the life 
insurance company on the equity call privilege. There is some slight 
evidence that company management at times is regretful after profits are 
taken. The questionnaire revealed that eleven life insurance companies 
had been informed by borrowing company managements that the borrowers 
were 11 giving away11 something in the negotiations. Tvvo life companies 
reported that the management actually resented the profits of the inves-
tor when the profits were taken. Probably these isolated cases stem from 
situations in which insufficient personal relations vmre developed between 
the parties during the period of the investment. An impressive majority 
of the life insurance companies surveyed, however, indicated that in their 
experience, profit taking has been follo~~d by genuine pleasure by company 
management that a profit was made on the issuer's secur:ities. This prob-
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ably results from a sincere conviction that since the investor's funds 
were in part responsible for increased company profits the investor 
should share in the rewards. Insofar as the borrovnng company is con-
cerned, certainly this attitude speaks well for subsequent financial 
relations with the life insurance company. The good will sterruning from 
such an association should be evident when negotiatine; the terms of 
other private placement sc3curities. The borrowing company may find that 
as a. result of a concession during negotiation of the first borrowing, it 
may later negotiate another financing with now-established friends on very 
favorable terms. 
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CHAPTER VII 
.ANALYTICAL TECHNIQD£S 
I. THE NEED FOR PRECISE ANALYSIS 
Despite the general belief of life insurance company investment 
officers that equity call privileges are usually obtained at no cost and 
are in effect a free 11kicker 11 or extra incentive to enter into the finan-
cing, these conversion privileges do, in fact, have a very real cost. 
The conversion privilege may have been negotiated in lieu of a higher 
interest rate, in which case the amount of interest foregone represents 
the price paid by the investor for the conversion privilege. In the 
other circumstance under which direct placement convertible security and 
warrant financings are conceived, they are offered as an offset to some 
additional element of risk not fully compensated for by the assured in-
terest alone. In this case the cost of the conversion privilege can be 
measured by how much additional interest would have been required by the 
investor as an incentive to undertake the financing. In either of these 
cases the price paid for the equity call arrangement is equal to the dif-
ference between the total interest to be received and the amount of inter-
est which could have been received had the funds been invested instead in 
an issue of comparable quality without a conversion privilege. 
No one can say with certainty exactly how much the equity call 
privilege will appreciate in value as a result of an increase in the 
market value of the underlyine common stock. But this does not negate 
the fact that a purchaser of any equity call security should compute the 
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price paid for it and then translate that cost into the amount of appre-
ciation necessary for the conversion privilege to recover its cost. With 
this knowledge the potential purchaser can make the judgement decision of 
whether or not the amount of appreciation necessary for the equity call to 
"break even" with the additional interest otherwise available is in fact 
a likely possibility. 
II. THE CONVERSICN TERMS AFFECTING THB REQUIR.F..;D APPRECIATION 
In the typical direct placement financing, the terms and pro-
visions concerning the basic loan and the equity call arrangement are not 
finalized until negotiations have been held with the institutional pur-
chaser. Therefore the opportunity is available to all parties to analyze 
and agree to the various terms of an equity call privilege which in the 
aggregate constitute how much common stock appreciation will be required 
to give the convertible or warrant a realized value. 
A basic factor to be considered is the form of equity call. A 
warrant issue enables the parties to negotiate the number of shares of 
stock obtainable under the exchange option. A convertible security auto-
matically predetermines this factor since the number of shares obtainable 
upon conversion is the function of the principal amount of the borrowing 
and the conversion price per share. The loan principal is determined by 
the borrower's need for funds and the lender's willingness to advance 
those funds under the credit circumstances present. Neither of these 
factors (which in turn regulate the number of shares obtainable upon con-
version) necessarily bear any relation to number of shares the lender feels 
is required under the circumstances. 
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The other conversion terms which, when added to the number of 
shares under option, constitute the variables determining the amount of 
appreciation necessary for the conversion privilege to recover its cost 
are: 1) the conversion or exercise price per share, 2) the existence or 
degree of subsequent increases in the option price, 3) the term of the 
option and 4) the period of time between option price increases, if there 
are any. When taken together these five variables constitute the degree 
of future profits on the equity call. During negotiations of them the 
lender must remember that in order to realize the profit needed to re-
cover the cost of the equity call, any detrimental change in the provi-
sions must be offset by an advantageous change in another of the vari-
ables. 
III. THE PRES:t'NT PRACTICES OF LIFE mSURAl\fCE CCMPAl\TIES 
The questionnaire inquired whether the life insurance company 
ever offered a reduction in interest rate on direct placement financings 
in order to obtain convertibles or warrants. Exactly one-half of the 
companies replied that they "always" or "frequently" made such offers. 
Only two replied that they 11never 11 offered to reduce rate, while a 
larger minority indicated they "rarely" did so. Apparently the practice 
of reducing the interest rate in exchange for a conversion privilege is 
a common one, while the practice of doing so at least occasionally is 
practically universal among life insurance companies. 
Another question inquired what techniques are used to evaluate 
these equity calls obtained at the expense of a lower interest rate. The 
companies were asked if they employ any formalized techniques or forecasts 
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to determine the possible return from the options. Surprisingly, from 
the replies received there appeared to be little evidence of the use of 
any consistent technique or analysis by which the warrants or convertibles 
are weighed against the interest foregone. 
Another question asked if the life companies, upon entering 
negotiations, use any formula or yardstick to determine the desired terms 
of the options. An overwhelming majority of the replies indicated that 
they use no such approach. The analytical techniques are either purely 
subjective--based on the investment manager's experience in such finan-
cings--or, if formalized, they consist of indirect approaches to the 
problem. 
One such approach used by a life insurance company is to trans-
late any request for funds by a hish-risk borrovrer into loan provisions 
which place the same amount of common stock under option as would have 
been so placed had the entire amount of funds been raised through a 
public issue of convertible securities. For example, if a potential 
borrower requested a $1,000,000 loan either under circumstances which the 
life company felt meant higher-than-average risk, or if a lower-than-
average interest rate were indicated, the number of shares obtainable 
through warrant exercise would equal the quantity obtainable under a 
$1,000,000 convertible public bond issue. If at that time publicly-
owned convertibles were being underwritten at a conversion price per 
share equal to 10% above the current market price, in the present illus-
tration about 10,101 shares would be put under option if the current 
market were $90 per share. ($1,000,000; 1.10 X $90 = 10,101). In 
other words, if the $1,000,000 were raised through the public sale of 
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convertible bonds, the company management would be forced to place 10,101 
shares of common stock under the conversion right. The insurance company 
approach is to calculate this figure and then to suggest that it will 
make a straight loan provided warrants are attached to the loan security 
providing for exercise into 10,101 shares of stock. The failing in this 
approach is that it does not evaluate the amount of the additional risk 
element nor does it compare the stock option with a possible additional 
current return from the alternative of a higher interest rate. Simply 
stated, it does not analyze the specific loan situation nor the possi-
bility of profits on the equity call. The same provision could have been 
calculated for a company with static profits as for a company with 
rapidly expanding profits (and presumably an increasing market value of 
the stock). 
Another approach in use by at least one investment officer is 
to ap9ortion a loan considered excessive into two elements: l) a loan 
amount which would normally be considered prudent under the credit cir-
cumstances, and 2) the balance equalling the remainder between the 
requested loan amount and the prudent loan amount which should represent 
in a conventional financing package the issue of additional carnnon stock. 
In illustration consider the $1,000,000 loan discussed earlier. Presuming 
the investing institution considered that in view of traditional credit 
standards the company should borrow only $700,000; in the analysis the 
remaining $300,000 requested should norwBlly represent equity securities. 
At a current market price of $90 per share, a common stock issue aggre-
gating ;j.JOO,OOO would require the offering of 3,333 l/3 shares of stock. 
The investing life insurance company then may agree to make the requested 
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:iJil,OOO,OOO loan on the condi t~_m that warrants are granted for the pur-
chase of 3,333 l/3 shares of conLrnon stock. Although this approach offers 
a rationale palatable to both borrower and lender, it does not satisfy 
the basic question of whether or not the warrant O[Jtion. has sufficient 
value to offset the increased risk. That is, it argues the case well 
from a 11balance sheet 11 or third party's viewpoint, but it 3;ives no 
assurance whatsoever to the inve.stor about the ultimate profitability 
of t~'le warrant. It makes no comparison to the facts peculiar to the loan 
situation. The number of shares under option would be the same regard-
less of the earnin.gs trend of the borrov.rer, the type of industry of the 
borrower, or the ammmt of interest fore;::;one, if any. 
In summary, the price considerations of equity calls have been 
neglected. The investing institutions admit foresakir1g an interest return 
without any estimate of what they are likely to realize on the equity calL 
Under these circumstances, it may well be that the life corfll)anies would 
have found it more profitable to secure additional interest. 
Admittedly, during the great bull market of the past decade 
there has been little opportunity to go astray whenever stock opportuni-
ties have been present. Furthermore, a for;aalized academic approach is 
not the panacea of security analysis. The ins ti tu ti onal investment 
officers, through years of experience, have developed a feel for invest-
ment situations--an abilitr to judge the future without formal methods 
of analysis. But the fact remains that by voluntarily reducing a~ interest 
rate to obtain an equity call an investor is automatically paying a price 
for it. He has the obli_:;ation to know how much this price is in dollar 
terms and whether or not he is likely to recover at least that much through 
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future profits on the conversion privilege. 
IV. A NEW APPROACH 
A calculation must be made to determine how much the stock 
underlying an equity call issue will have to appreciate in price to 
offset interest foregone. Following the deter1nination of the required 
amount of common stock appreciation necessary to assure a profit over 
and above the additional increment of interest otherwise obtainable, 
the terms of the equity call may be negotiated to insure that profit. 
A simple and reliable technique is to compute the present value of the 
interest foregone and to equate the result to the required profit on 
the stock. This teclmigue can best be illustrated by reference to the 
actual case histories cited in Chapter III of this study. 
The ! Company. In 1958 a life insurance company was asked to 
make a $1,500,000 fifteen-year loan to "The A Company" for the purpose of 
transferrine ownership of the company to a new grou,) of shareholders. 
Following considerable negotiations the loaD was suggested on either of 
two al tarnatives. First, the loan might be made at 5~% which at the time 
was a fair rate under the credit circumstances. Seca1d, the loan might be 
made at 5% provided warrants were included entitline the insurance company 
to purchase 5,000 shares of common stock at -il>l2 per share for the first 
three years of the loan, at $15 per share for the next three years and 
finally at $20 per share for an addHional three-year period. The company 
was then beine; recapitalized and the stock was to have a beginning book 
value of $10 per share. Future earnings-per-share were conservatively 
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estimated at ~P4 per share and no dividend payments were contemplated. 
The life insurance company could therefore contemplate an initial return 
on book value of 40% per annum and it was clear that the warrant option 
would have value within the first six months. Which of the two alter-
natives should have been the most attractive to the life insurance com-
pany--the additional interest return or the warrant option? 
The first step in the analysis is to compute the present value 
of the one-half of one per cent on $1,500,000 which would be foregone 
over a fifteen-year period. Table IV reveals the present value after 
income tax of various increments of interest on $1000 loans which are 
amortized in equal amounts annually over their term. It shows that the 
present value of one-half of one per cent in interest on a $1000 fifteen-
year loan is $19.03204566 when discounted at 6%. This figure is net 
after income taxes that would have to be paid on interest income at a tax 
rate of 35%--the approximate effective tax rate on increments of invest-
ment income above 4% per annum pursuant to the federal tax legislation 
for life insurance companies passed by Congress in 1959. Multiplying 
that value by #1,500 gives the total present value of the interest fore-
gone on the proposed loan of $28,548. In other words, the extra one-half 
of one per cent in interest has a lump swn value today of ;ip28,548. The 
investing life insurance company is just as well off if the company pays 
5% plus something worth $28,548 as it is if the company pays a flat 5~% 
on the loan. The investor should know then, that whatever profits it is 
likely to make on the proposed conversion feature must have a present 
value at least equal to ;jf,28 ,548 for it to be worthwhile to elect the 
equity call alternative. Failins that test it cannot justify making the 
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TABLE IV 
~~ 
PRESENT VALUE OF INTEREST FOREGQ\IE 
Rate of 
Interest Term of Loan 
Foregone 10 years 12 years 1j years 20 years 
1/8% 3.57488213 4.05888253 4.75801141 5. 77557417 
1/4 7.14976426 8.11776506 9.51602283 11.55114834 
3/8 10.72464639 12.17664759 14.27403424 17.32672250 
1/2 14.29952852 16.23553012 19.03204566 23.10229667 
5/8 17.87441065 20.29441265 23.79005707 28.87787084 
3/4 21.1~4929277 24.35329517 28.54806848 34.65344501 
7/8 25.02417490 28.41217770 33.30607990 40.42901918 
l 28.59905703 32.47106023 38.06409131 46.20459334 
*Present value after income tax of interest foregone an a $1000 
loan maturing in the indicated number of years, assuming: 1) the principal 
of the loan is amortized annually in equal amounts sufficient to repay 
the loan in full at maturity, 2) the interest foregone is discounted at 
6%, and 3) the :income tax rate on the interest foregone is 35%. 
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loan at the lower interest rate. 
Any cormnon stock analysis must necessarily recognize all or 
as many of the price-influencing factors as possible. As pointed out 
by Clendenin, 
The prices paid for stocks in both listed and over-the-
counter markets are unquestionably prices, made by supply 
and demand, and subject to all of the ideas, habits, pre-
judices, legal restrictions, and errors which enter into 
the decisions of individual buyers and sellers. The analyst 
who attempts to estimate the probable future prices of 
stocks must therefore not only gauge the future earnings, 
dividends, market conditions, and other factors which will 
influence buyers and sellers; he must, in addition, esti19 mate how buyers and sellers will react to these factors. , 
It is not the purpose of this study to develop and sug;est a 
technique for co~non stock analysis. The investment officer confronted 
with the decision to forego interest income has the use of such familiar 
tools as price-earnings ratios and the many market and technical analy-
ses. He also has available several interesting new concepts of common 
* stock analysis. Even more important than the statistical tools em-
played are the investment officer's subsequent adjustments to his 
estimates based upon subjective consiQerations. The significant point 
is that a careful evaluation of future stock prices must be made, and 
it must be one based on conservative estimates since the alternative of 
higher interest payments is contractually guaranteed. 
Once a determination is made of future possible profits on the 
equity call privilege, they too must be reduced to their present values 
-~-See for example John C. Clendenin's Occasional Papar No. 1 enti-
tled Theory and Technique of Growth Stock Valuation, Bureau of Business and 
Economic Research, University of California, Los An8;eles, California, 1957. 
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so that they can be compared with the present value of the interest 
foregone. Table V lists the present values of future profits of $1000, 
and the potential estimated profit need only be revised upward from the 
$1000 base. This table makes no allowance for capital gains taxes be-
cause as a practical matter no capital gains tax will be paid in the 
foreseeable future by any life insurance company. This is due to the 
right to offset gains a;Sainst losses and the many unrealized losses an 
the books of all insurance companies stemming from the purchase of low-
coupon bonds at par during periods of low interest rates. 
In the case of 11 The A Company", a conservative forecast of 
possible future profits on the warrant option can easily be estimated 
in view of the buy-back agreement based on book value and the projected 
increase in book value of $•4 per share per annum. Table VI presents the 
estimated future book value of each share based on this annual increase. 
It also shows the warrant exercise price d1rring the ap~licable years and 
the amount of profit if the warrants were exercised and the resulting 
shares sold to the company at their then-existing book value. Finally, 
through application of the data in Table V, this table shows the present 
value of the future profits and the excess of those amounts over the pre-
sent value of the additional interest othenv~se obtaLnable. 
It is apparent that despite a forecast tripling the book value 
per share in five years, the warrants are worth little more than the 
interest foregone until the fifth year when, if the projected profit is 
realized in that year, they are worth $27,496 more than the additional 
interest othervv-ise received. Furthermore, due to the increase every 
three years of the warrant price this alternative has very little 
TABLE V 
Pru~SENT VALUE OF A FUTURE PROFIT OF $1000 
DISCOUNTED AT 6% 
Number of Years From 
Now in Which the 
Profit is Realized 
l 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
72 
Present Value 
of Profit 
943.39623 
889.99644 
839.61928 
792.09366 
747.25817 
704.96054 
665.05711 
627.41237 
591.89846 
558.39478 
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TABLE VI 
PROFIT FORECAST FOR THE A CO\tiPANY 
Estim. Prevailing 
Book Warrant Estim. PrGsent Excess of 
Value Exercise Potential Total Value Profit 1s 
At the Per Share Price Profit Profit of Total Present 
End of ($4 annual p:Jr p:Jr for 5000 Potential Value Over 
Year increase) Share Share Shares Profits :W28z548 
1 $14.00 $12.00 $ 2.00 $ 10,000 $ 9,434 None 
2 18.00 12.00 6.00 30,000 26,700 None 
3 22.00 12.00 10.00 50,000 41,981 $13,433 
4 26.00 15.00 ll.OO 55,000 43,565 15,017 
5 30.00 15.00 15.00 75,000 56,044 27,496 
6 34.00 15.00 19.00 95,000 66,971 38,423 
7 38.00 20.00 18.00 90,000 59,855 31,307 
8 42.00 20.00 22.00 110,000 69,015 40,467 
9 46.00 20.00 26.00 130,000 76,947 48,399 
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additional promise until the eighth and ninth (final year of the warrant 
term) years--a point in time too far away to rely upon. Due to the vag-
aries of common stock investments per se, the investor should look no 
further than a maximum of five or six years during which to recover the 
value otherwise attainable by receiving a guaranteed higher interest rate. 
It appears that an election by the life insurance CcTtpany of the 
higher interest rate would have been the prudent choice. On the basis of 
the forecast, profits would have to be realiz,ed at the end of the fifth 
year, and then the total return from the warrants would have been the 
equivalent of an additional 1% in interest--only one-half of one per cent 
above that absolutely guaranteed by the flat 5~-% interest rate. As for 
the margin for error, the annual increase in book value can fall from the 
estimated $;4 to about $2.50 before the alternative of the 5~% rate alone 
would be more profitable • 
This, then, indicates the range of possibilities from which the 
final determination must be made. On the basis of a reasonably assured 
rate of earnings-per-share of $4, the warrant feature is the equivalent of 
an additional 1% in interest on the loan amount. If, however, annual earn-
ings-per-share of only $2.50 are achieved, the warrant option is the equi-
valent of only t of 1% in additional interest, which is the amount of 
additional interest offered on a straight debt security. Therefore earn-
ine;s-per-share of less than $2.50 will result in an investment return 
less than that obtainable on an interest basis alone. The investment 
officer must make the decision of how likely, in his judgement, the com-
pany's earnir_gs ~~ll fall below the forecasted level. After determining 
the adverse possibilities, he must then analyze the possibility of profits 
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far beyond those forecasted. His final decision may well depend on the 
relative likelihood of these two possibilities. 
At least as important as its application lll choosing between 
two pre-determined investment alternatives is the use of the theory to 
focus attention an terms prior to negotiations. In the case of The A 
Company above, it would have been realized that the interest foregone 
was relatively more important due to the size of the loan and that 
therefore the investor should negotiate for either more shares of stock 
under option or for purchase prices more favorable than tbe 3-step ones 
t;ranted. The variables affecting the present value of interest foregone 
are the percentage of rate foregone, the principal amount of the loan, 
and the term of the loan. The variables affecting the present value of 
the warrant or conversi cr1 feature are the number of shares under option, 
the option price and subsequent increases in the price, the term of the 
option and the projected increase in value per common share. A simple 
computation in advance of negotiations would demonstrate how much inter-
est can safely be traoed away provided a sufficient potential profit can 
be assured on the "kicker". The prior knowledge of this required profit 
would give a solid basis upon which to negotiate the number of shares 
under option and the option price correspondingly required. 
The £ Company. Another illustration in the application of this 
approach can be made by reference to another case history cited previously 
in Chapter III. 
In 1959 a life insurance company was asked to consider the pur-
chase of a convertible note issue of "The B Company". This company 
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planned to sell a $1,000,000 5% Note maturing in 20 years, convertible 
at any time into cor:unon stock at a price of .f:;35 per share. The current 
market price was $30. Informal discussions made it apparent that the 
company management woulci refuse to make the terms any more favorable to 
the buyer than these. There was no question about the credit of the com-
pany, its type of business, or the ability of its management group. It 
was an excellent company. The only question concerned the terms of the 
proposed issue. The sug-?;ested 5% interest rate was approximately 1% be-
low the rate at which there were available al temative investments in 
companies of comparable credit. The question then was this: is the 
conversion privilege sufficiently attractive to more than offset the 1% 
in additional interest otherwise available on a 6% $1,000,000 20-year 
loan? (The alternative loan must be assured to have a sinkine; fund 
sufficient to repay the principal in equal annual payments over the 
20-year period. This is the usual case when no conversion feature is 
present.) 
The first step is to compute the present value of the 1% in 
interest foregone. Table IV gives this value on the basis of a $1,000 
20-year loan. Multiplyine that value by 1000 gives a present value of 
the interest foregone of a $1,000,000 loan of $46,204.59. The investor 
is just as Vlell off if the Company pays 5% per annum in interest plus 
something else presently worth $46,204.59 as he is if the Company pays 
6% for the life of the loan. Therefore, whatever profits may be made on 
the proposed conversion feature must have a present value of at least 
$46,204.59. Failing that test, the ~-urchase of the convertible secur:'Lt.y 
cannot be justified. 
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An analysis of The B Company's past record as presented in 
Table VII indicates an annual increase in earninEs-per-share of about 
8% per annum. It also reveals an average historical price-earnings 
ratio of 8.8. From the facts known by the investor about the company's 
industry and the present outlook for the company's earnings potential 
within the immediate years ahead, the decision is made that the historical 
rate of earnings groVIrth and price-earnings ratio are still appropriate 
and can be conservatively relied upon in the future. Based on this in-
formation, Table VIII presents a forecast of the future market value of 
the shares under option and the related present valws of the gains 
taken in any given year. Most significantly, it indicates the excess, 
if any, of the present value of future realized gains over the present 
value of the interest foregone. It is self-evident that there is no 
advantage in the conversion privilege until the fourth year and there 
is no substantial advantage until the fifth and sixth years. Assmning 
the forecast period should not exceed five years, the present value of 
the equity-call is ~147,101. This amount exceeds the present value of 
the higher interest rate alternative by approximately $100,000. If in 
fact the profit is realized at the end of the fifth year, the total re-
turn translated into interest alone would be the equivalent of slightly 
over 8%. Perhaps the most important consideration though is how wide a 
margin of error there is in the stock forecast. A simple calculation 
reveals that the total return from the convertible issue would be exactly 
equal to the alternative of 6% interest if a profit is realized of only 
$61,833 in the fifth year. For such a reduced profit to be possible a 
reduction in the growth rate from 8% to 5!% would be required, (and a 
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TABLE VII 
FINANCIAL DATA REGARDING THE B COiVIPANY 
Average 
Market Value Price/ 
Ear-nings % Increase Price Ran~e Average Earnings 
Year Per Share in E.P.S. High Low Price Ratio 
1954 :jji2.10 $21 $16 3/4 $18.88 9.0 
1955 2.17 3.3 24 1/2 20 22.25 10.3 
1956 2.42 ll.) 25 19 1/2 22.50 9.3 
1957 2.69 11.2 23 17 3/4 20.38 7.6 
1958 2.73 1.5 25 3/4 18 1/4 22.00 8.1 
1959 3.2~ 15.7 31 1/2 24 1/2 28.00 B.6 
Average T.b tr:13 
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TABLE VIII 
PROFIT FORECAST FOR THE B COMPAHY 
X11ean rrofit 
Estim. tviarket Over Total Excess of 
Earnings Price Conversion Forecasted Present Profit's 
At the Per Share Per Share Price Profit Value of Present 
End of (8% (8.8 P/E of $35 (28,571 Future Value Over 
Year Growth) Ratio) Per Share shares) Profit N~6z205 
1960 ~3.50 ~30.80 None None None None 
1961 3.78 33.26 None None None None 
1962 4.08 35.90 .90 ;1;,25, 714 $21,590 None 
1963 4.Ll 38.80 3.80 10b,570 85,998 ~139' 793 
1964 4.76 41.89 6.89 196,854 147,101 100,896 
1965 5.14 45.23 10.23 292,281 206,047 159,84.2 
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continuation of the 8.8 price-earnings ratio), or a continuation in the 
8% growth rate but a price-earnings ratio decrease from 8.8 to 7.8. 
This appears to be a fairly slim margin for error. The invest-
ment officer's decision should depend on the calculated risk of the like-
lihood of his forecast falling short of eventual prices versus the likeli-
hood of future prices far in excess of his estimates. 
An advance analysis such as this would have established a pre-
cise basis from which the life insurance company investment officer 
could evaluate the attractiveness of the ccnversion feature. Clearly it 
would not have certified to him what the future profits on the conversion 
feature would, in fact, amount to in each of the years. But it would have 
told him how much those future profits must ~ for the conversion feature 
to be more attractive than an alternative investment at a higher interest 
rate. Knowing this, he could have assessed the future possibilities of 
the required profit being attained. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
SUMtv.tARY 
The investment practice of issuing direct placement convertible 
and warrant securities has become increasingly frequent within the past 
several years. A survey of the largest life insurance companies in the 
United States and an analysis of this development 1 s correlation to the 
country's economic growth give every reason to believe that it will be-
come an even more frequently-used financing technique during future years. 
In part caused by the recent period of high interest rates and 
an unprecedented corporate demand for funds, this new development offers 
advantages to both the issuer and the investor. With regard to the for-
mer, a major advantage is that it has provided funds that otherwise 
would not have been available to borrowing corporations of marginal 
credit. Vvith respect to the investing institutions, the experience to 
date indicates that the return on these investments can be very substantial, 
thereby resulting in an increased investment return to the participant. 
Equity call financings also present practical problems to both 
parties. Of particular significance to the investor is the determination 
of profit-taking techniques and timing. As for the issuing corporation, 
a careful comparison should be made with other capital-raising techniques, 
as it is possible that the long range effects of such financings can be 
more detrimental than the hi"':her immediate costs of the alternatives. 
Profitable to date, in part, due to a risin~ stock market, it 
may well be that fundamental methods of analysis have not as yet been 
formalized. Furthermore there is evidence that investing institutions 
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are sufficiently impressed by their own and other companies 1 profits to 
date on these financings that the practice of voluntarily reducing the 
interest rate on the basic security is becoming commonplace. An approach 
which may be useful to the investor in evaluating the true "cost" of the 
equity call is a technique which reduces its ultimate profitability to a 
present value comparable to that of the assured higher interest return. 
Given the knowledge of the degree of future profits needed to make the 
equity call financing an attractive investment opportunity, the invest-
ment manager may then determine the specific conversion terms required to 
make the future profits attainable. 
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